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Estreicher: Employer Reputation at Work

ARTICLES
EMPLOYER REPUTATION AT WORK
Samuel Estreicher*
Employer reputational costs-that is, the loss in value of the
firm's reputational assets if the firm reneges on its promises to workers,
whether express or implied-has played an important role in the economic literature of employment contracts, but this factor has itself generated little sustained analysis. Reputation is often offered as a lateappearing deus ex machina explaining why opportunistic behavior by
employers even in internal labor markets is likely to be relatively unimportant. A standard treatment is offered by Wachter and Wright:
Reputational considerations are also frequently cited as critical in restraining strategic behavior. Obviously firms are more likely than
workers to acquire reputations in the external labor market. To the extent that firms engage in strategic behavior at the cost of workers, their
reputation in the external labor market will suffer. These firms will
have to pay higher wages to attract new workers or it will find it more
costly to continue the contract provision that requires the workers to
post a bond in the form of deferred compensation.

Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law & Faculty Director, Center for Labor and Employment
Law, New York University School of Law. An early version of this paper was prepared for the
NYU Center's Research Conference on Behavioral Law and Economics in the Workplace, April 10,
2001. 1 focus here on the role of employer reputation in the operation of labor markets. Reputational costs to employees, while indeed important, are beyond the scope of this paper. The latter
issues are usefully explored in J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Policies, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1998). 1thank my colleagues Michael Levine of NYU and Laurence
Gold of Bredhoff & Kaiser for their helpful comments; all remaining errors are my own.
1. Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, 29
INDUs. RELS. 240, 252 (1990). Reputational costs play a pervasive role in Wachter's account of the
operation of internal labor markets and the role of labor law. See, e.g., The Enforceability of Norms
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996) (with Edward B. Rock); Labor
Law Successorship: A Corporate Law Approach, 92 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1993) (with Edward B.
Rock); Replacing Striking Workers: The Law and Economics Approach, in PROC. N.Y.U. 43D ANN.
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This explanation for the enforceability of implicit labor contracts in
internal labor markets is problematic. It assumes a well-functioning
market in information about past and projected firm behavior, for a loss
in reputation can only occur if job applicants from the external labor
market are able readily to distinguish between "opportunistic" behavior
(where, say, a termination of employment reflects an employer's reneging on implied promises of deferred compensation or late-career immunity from close monitoring of performance) and legitimate behavior
(where a discharge reflects an appropriate response to shirking on the
job or unforeseen adverse business conditions).
Even more fatal, the reputational-loss explanation assumes that employers in the first period (when they make the implied promise of deferred compensation or late-career job security) are in the same product
market position in the later period (when they are expected to perform
these implied promises). If the employer in the later period has disappeared, operates in a different product market, or has a need for workers
with a different skill mix than in the first period, it will become even
more difficult for job applicants in the external labor market to evaluate
whether the firm's past behavior is relevant to their probable job experience with that firm.
The reputational explanation also makes certain assumptions about
how workers process information. As Lome Carmichael (a leading student of reputation in labor markets) puts it:
Firms' reputations ... enter into the model in the way workers form
their expectations about the expected utility each firm offers. Workers
are assumed to possess very good information about the way each firm
has treated its workers in the past. They also are aware of the distribution of states of the world, and observe the states when they are revealed. They believe (correctly) that each firm's technology is stable,
so that their best predictor of what the firm will do in a given state is
simply what the firm did the last time the state occurred.
I. WHAT IS

EMPLOYER REPUTATION?

Initially, we need a definition of what the term "reputation" means
CONT. ON LABOR ch. 6, p. 118 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990) (with George M. Cohen); The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining:An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, PartialClosure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (with George M. Cohen).
2. H. Lome Carmichael, Reputations in the Labor Market, 74 AMER. ECON. REV. 713, 716
(1984). See generally Carmichael, Self-Enforcing Contracts, Shirking, and Life Cycle Incentives, 3
J. ECON. PERSP. 65 (1989).
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in this context. Reputation here refers to characteristics of the firm that
are not readily verifiable by job applicants. In colloquial usage, the term
is also often used as a shorthand for verifiable characteristics, as when
the reputation of law schools is based on the median LSAT scores of its
admitted students or the placement record of its graduates; or when the
reputation of law firms is based on per partner profitability or the prevalence of judicial clerkships among its incoming class. In these circumstances, however, applicants can readily obtain the background statistic.
Although a process of inference is involved in drawing lessons from the
available verifiable information about the desired characteristics, the
process is itself not very difficult, and the ultimate criterion appears to
be one of selectivity, which is captured by the background statistic.
The reputational factor that arguably explains the enforceability of
implied employment contracts, however, involves characteristics of the
firm that are not readily verifiable. Here, the firm's reputation offers no
more than a second-best purchase on those characteristics. The job applicant knows the wage and working conditions and, to the extent gleanable from public information, the present profitability of the firm. What
the applicant does not know and cannot easily find out is information
concerning (1) the future economic health of the firm; (2) the economic
health of, and future plans for, the particular division or facility the applicant is interested in;3 (3) whether the firm will make (what the applicant will regard as) "fair" compensation, promotion and discipline decisions; and (4) whether the firm will live up to implied promises of
deferred compensation and late-career job security. All of these are aspects of future performance by the firm. Predictions are required, predicated largely on the firm's reputation in the labor market.
Of course, if the job applicant has unlimited resources to expend in
the search process, and is given unrestricted access to (and could obtain
reliable information from) current employees, the applicant could learn a
good deal more about the firm's actual record and draw improved inferences accordingly. In the real world, however, this would not be a rational investment of resources for any particular applicant to make.
Moreover, there is reason to doubt whether he could obtain reliable information from past or current employees. Discharged shirkers would
be unlikely to be forthcoming about the real basis for their loss of employment, and current employees may be less than candid about their
situation (downplaying negative facts if they fear employer retaliation or

3. Public information like 10-K reports required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission help illuminate the firm's general profitability but do not ordinarily disclose profit figures
or future plans for particular divisions or facilities likely to be the locus of employment.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

3

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:1

suffer from cognitive dissonance or themselves desire that the applicant
join them, or overstating negative facts if they are unreasonably disgruntled or wish to discourage ambitious applicants from joining their ranks).
Moreover, unlike financial markets, sophisticated, well-informed job applicants who have a special ability to evaluate the firm's record, are not
likely to influence firm behavior because they will exit from the applicant pool to pursue better opportunities elsewhere. 4 Instead, the typical
applicant must do the best he can with the information he can easily verify and the aspects of firm reputation he can glean from readily available sources.
II. WHY DOES THE EMPLOYER CARE ABOUT ITS REPUTATION?
Given the amorphousness of reputation as a firm asset, and the difficulty applicants have in evaluating firm reputation, we should ask why
employers care at all whether they have reputations as "good" employers.
There are employment settings where employers plainly do not
care. Where employers hire from the low-skill segment of the external
labor market, expect high turnover, and can easily monitor job performance, they can obtain the workforce they need by simply paying the
going wage in that labor market. Each day in a sense leads to the formation of a new "at will" employment contract; there is no need for a contingent contract to deal with future contingencies.
At the high-skill end of the external labor market, a similar process
may be at work. Where workers have highly portable skills and their
performance can be easily monitored, they may be hired effectively on a
project-only basis. Both employer and employee have no particular interest in contracting for continued employment; hence, they have relatively little need for a contingent contract to deal with future contingencies.
The reputation issue arises principally in "internal labor market"
firms,5 where employers have an interest in encouraging some measure
of job commitment by employees, and employees have an interest in
some measure of continued employment with the firm. Here, judgments
about future conditions at the firm are relevant to the job applicant, and

4. See Carmichael, supra note 2, at 715 ("It is not the case ... that such intelligent or wellinformed agents will dominate the sample in the way they do in financial market. In fact, successful
agents may leave the sample if they find themselves with some rents and some searching.").
5. This concept was first developed in PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE,
INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS (1971).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol27/iss1/1

4

Estreicher: Employer Reputation at Work

2009]

EMPLOYER REPUTATION AT WORK

the firm has an interest in maintaining its reputation as a promise-keeper.
In theory, the parties to a prospective internal labor market employment relationship would write a fully specified agreement, setting
out the conditions for future compensation, promotion prospects and the
like. However, contracts here are likely to be implicit because (1) the
firm's future economic position or other factors influencing future compensation, promotions and the like are not usually knowable ex ante; (2)
employee performance (by hypothesis) is not readily monitorable; and
(3) a fully specified contract would be difficult to write even where predictions as to (1) and (2) could be solidly based.
It has been suggested that the internal labor market is fast becoming
a relic in today's economy. Some point to an increasing incidence of
workers changing employers. 6 Others point to changes in technology
rendering employee acquisition of firm-specific skills (skills that increase with the particular employer but not to the same extent in the external labor market) increasingly unnecessary; others to legal innovations such as the vesting of defined pension benefits or the shift to
portable defined contribution plans and the abolition of mandatory retirement 7 as undermining the efficiency of internal labor market arrangements.
Although significant changes have occurred in U.S. labor markets-some firms are less concerned about job commitment, and some
workers are less concerned about job security than they have been in the
past-internal labor market firms are likely to continue to be important
for some time. For many job applicants, a reasonable prospect of continued employment with the same employer is desirable because it helps
facilitate location and family planning decisions; and a pay system that
rewards tenure is valued because it "appears to correspond to strong
psychological desires for a sense of improvement over time and for the
deferral of rewards-even when the aggregate economic return to the
employee is no better than if payment were pegged directly to productivity."' 8 To the extent firms believe that applicants with such preferences
are likely to possess unobservable characteristics associated with valuable subsequent performance (again, under conditions in which performance is not readily monitorable), they will want to attract (and keep)

6. Mean tenure (years with the same employer) and long-term employment (say, the fraction
of workers aged 35-64 with their employer for at least 10 years) are declining in the U.S. private
sector. See Henry S. Farber, Job Loss and the Decline in Job Security in the United States (CEPS,

Working Paper No. 171, June 2008).
7. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age DiscriminationReally Age Discrimination?: The ADEA 'sUnnaturalSolution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780 (1997).

8. Id.
at 791.
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even in the absence of
such workers. This phenomenon should continue
9
any premium paid for firm-specific skills.
Reputation thus acts in a manner analogous to the "efficiency"
wage model advanced by Akerlof and others.'0 It is a factor that helps
attract and retain desired workers under conditions where monitoring of
ongoing worker performance is difficult.

III. ENFORCEABILITY PROBLEMS
This brings us to the question of whether implicit employer promises in internal labor market arrangements are capable of being selfenforced through the reputation mechanism. To highlight the issue, consider Lazear's oft-cited account of why employers are not likely to renege on such promises when they benefit from a pay system that pays
workers less than their marginal productivity when workers are junior
and pays them more than their marginal productivity when they are senior:
Firms may also deviate from the contract. The most obvious form of
deviation manifests itself as unanticipated termination of the worker's
labor contract before time T [the "socially efficient point of contract
termination"].II For example, in a world where no information passes
from old workers to new workers, it is optimal for the firm to terminate
all workers at time t- [where the wage begins to exceed the worker's
marginal productivity]. It is unlikely, however, that contract violations
9. The acquisition of firm-specific skills, while significant in DOERINGER & PIORE, supra
note 5, at 15-16, and in Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter & Jeffrey E. Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON., 250
(1975), is not an important part of other influential accounts of internal labor markets. See
AKERLOF, infra note 10; see also Edward P. Lazear, Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J.
POL. ECON. 1261 (1979); and his Agency, Earnings,Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restriction,
71 AM. ECON. REv. 606, 607 (1981) ("Even in the absence of any on-the-job training or investment
in human capital, it pays to enter into long-term wage-employment relationships which pay workers
wage rates less than [the value of their marginal productivity ("VMP")] when they are junior, and
more than their VMP when they are senior employees."). See also James M. Malcomson, Work
Incentives, Hierarchy,and InternalLabor Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 486, 490 (1984).
10. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF, AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES (1984);
EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORIES OF THE LABOR MARKET (George A. Akerlof & Janet Yellen eds.,

1986).
11. This is defined by Lazear as the point at which "the value of a worker's time used outside
the firm exceeds the value of his time used inside the firm," i.e., the point at which the present value
of the internal wage path is equal to the present value of the worker's opportunity costs in the external labor market. Because the worker would prefer working beyond this time, since the wage continues to exceed both his external wage as well as his marginal productivity to the employer, Lazear
would permit mandatory retirement at this point. See Lazear, Agency, EarningsProfiles, supra note
9, at 607 & n.2. Age-based mandatory retirement is, of course, no longer lawful in the U.S.
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are costless. To the extent that new workers use the firm's history as12
an indicator of future honesty, a cost is associated with any violation?
The question, of course, is what is the likely magnitude of this cost?
A. Reliable InformationAbout PastFirm Behavior
Can applicants obtain reliable information about the firm's past behavior. In most employment settings, reliable information about the
firm's record of promise-keeping is not readily obtainable. Current employees are likely to be the best source of such information but, under
real world conditions, they are not likely to transmit this information to
job applicants. Moreover, they are unlikely to transmit clear informational signals by exiting employment, because it is difficult to evaluate
why employees are leaving and, given the lock-in effect of the internal
labor market contract, it is difficult to evaluate why they stay.
In some settings, there are mediating institutions that help lower
some of these information costs. Unions are ideally suited to play this
role, to the extent they function as keepers of the institutional memory of
the firm and adopt policies, such as use of seniority as the basis for allocating the risk of layoff, that help deter employer opportunistic behavior

12.

Id. at 607-08, 607 fig.l.
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at the expense of late-career employees. Hyde also has written about the
role of employee caucuses and other institutions that facilitate information-sharing between employees and applicants.13 In most situations,
however, these institutions have not formed, and are not likely to.
B. Change in the Firm's Product Market Position
Signals from changes in employment levels are also difficult to
read. To the extent firms go out of business or exit from a particular
product market at a later stage, staff reductions are less likely to be perceived by remaining or new employees as a reneging on past promises,
and the firm is also less likely to care about reputational loss to the extent its hiring needs have materially changed. The seniority principle,
championed by labor unions 14 but also used by many non-union employers, moreover generally favors the more senior worker-the category of
workers otherwise likely to complain of employer opportunism-in retention or early retirement buyout decisions.
C. Difficulties in ProcessingInformation About a Firm's Record
In addition to these difficulties, the behavioral law and economics
("BLE") literature suggests that applicants will not be able to do a particularly good job processing information about the firm's record of
promise-keeping. These cognitive limitations are likely to obtain even if
we assume information is readily obtainable.
One problem is the assessment of low-probability events, for any
opportunism is likely to occur in the case of late-career employees. The
BLE work thus far offers competing readings of how workers process
information about low-probability events. Kim and others argue that
workers are unduly optimistic;' 5 Viscusi, on the other hand, finds they

13. Alan Hyde, Employee Organizations in High-Velocity Labor Markets, in Employee Representation, in THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING, PROC. N.Y.U. 5 0T" ANN. CONF. ON LABOR ch. 12 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998).

14. However, unlike the situation where the firm continues in a steady state, unions are not
likely to continue to have a presence when the firm goes out of business or exit a particular product
market, to the extent the new employing entity hires an entirely new workforce. This is because
purchasers of the assets of a business have no obligation to assume the collective bargaining obligations of the seller, and indeed have a right to hire an entirely new workforce, as long as they do not
discriminate against the seller's employees because of their union status. See NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S. 272 (1972); Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
The existing doctrine is defended in Wachter & Rock, Labor Law Successorship, supranote 1.
15. See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers'
Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447 (1999).
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are unduly pessimistic. 16
A second problem is the assessment of complex multivariate phenomenon. Here, the future contingencies that are likely to unravel implied promises cannot be specified ex ante, and applicants will have difficulty reading the signals from salient events, such as layoff
announcements: are layoffs legitimate responses to unforeseeable economic conditions or do they reflect an opportunistic reneging on past
implied promises? 7 Applicants will also have difficulty determining
whether the skill mix and other attributes they bring to the job are sufficiently
similar to the characteristics of those laid off, such that they face a comparable
risk of (unjustified) layoff.1 8
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Does the law have a role to play in helping promote enforcement of
implied employment contracts? On one level, it might be said that to the
extent contracts are implied, the parties know there are risks associated
with their arrangement. They are betting on the future, and presumably
are comfortable ex ante with (or at least have factored into their bargaining position) the lack of specification. Moreover, it may well be that the
enforceability of implied employment contracts becomes a less troubling
issue to the extent employers move away from deferred compensation as
a screening or commitment device and pensions take the form of defined
contribution plans. 19
We assume, for purposes below, continued reliance on implied
promises of deferred compensation. The concern arises from the employees' perspective: both those caught in the midstream who suffer an
opportunistic late-career change in their deferred compensation/job security package, and new hires who misread the employer's reputation as a
promise-keeper.
One approach might be to improve the market for information, say,
by subsidizing the development of information-sharing networks where
unions are not present to do the job. The Internet should facilitate the
16.

See W. KIP ViSCUSi, RATIONAL RISK POLICY (1998).

17. Unfair-dismissal or discrimination lawsuits are no easier to evaluate. Most claims cannot
attract lawyers. Of those that do, the overwhelming number of cases settle, without reliable information being imparted about the employer's behavior. Even cases resulting in litigated judgments
are "noisy." Are they attributable to isolated instances of misbehavior by agents of the employer?
Are they attributable to the relative ease with lawsuits can be pursued? And so on.
18. This problem is further complicated by the practice of at least large employers to offer
enhanced severance benefits in exchange for release of all claims.
19. See Samuel Estreicher & Laurence Gold, The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution Pension Plans, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 101 (2007).
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gathering and categorization of information. 20 The law might impose a
tax on employers, similar to the experience rating of employers under
unemployment insurance, to finance the operation of such networks.
However, absent the commitment of extensive resources to ensure that
such information is sufficiently reliable and understandable to guide job
applicant and employee decisions, the mere provision of information
will not mitigate the information-processing limitations of applicants.21
Sunstein suggests that perhaps changes in default rules can be designed to force employers to give better signals as to firm culture and
their record of promise-keeping.2 2 However, a reversible "just cause"
default rule, even if enhanced in the ways Estlund recommends, 23 is not
likely to do very much to improve the quality or the processing of information. The experience of jurisdictions like California and Michigan
that have gone the furthest in this direction is that employers readily contract out of a "just cause" default rule, presumably without any marked
effect on the quality of their applicants. 24
Applicants seeking employment with an internal labor market firm
are not necessarily looking for explicit "just cause" employment contracts. When confronted with employers who, responding to Sunstein's
change in the background rule from "at will" to a "cause" regime, expressly disclaim any binding commitment not to discharge without
cause, these job-seekers may, as Morriss suggests, 25 properly discount
the incidence of wrongful dismissal and decline to negotiate varying
terms. Rather, what they are seeking is some assurance that the firm is
one with which they reasonably can make a career. Such assurance cannot be reduced to contract because, as earlier explained, future contingencies likely to affect the firm's ability to provide a secure working environment in the later stages of their employment cannot be readily
spelled out. The most that can be expected is a good basis for predicting
the firm's future performance based on its past record, and this requires
some mechanism for storing, accessing, and evaluating the firm's insti-

20. See generally David H. Autor, Wiring the Labor Market (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. W7959, Oct. 2000).
21. For an interesting proposal to mandate systematic provision of information, see Cynthia
L. Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency (unpublished manuscript, 2010)
(on file with author).
22. See Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002).
23. See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It
Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 6 (2002).
24.

See generally Max Schanzenbach, Exceptions to Employment at Will: Raising Firing

Costs or EnforcingLife-Cycle Contracts, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 470 (2003).
25. See Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data,Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful DischargeLaw, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1901, 1917 (1996).
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tutional history.
One approach suggested by Weiler is to have the law require every
firm over a certain size to establish an inside-the-firm employee organization that would serve as a repository of institutional memory and enforcement agent for job security promises. 26 In his proposal, this organization could convert itself into a traditional labor union.2 7
Weiler's proposal merits more attention than it has received in the
nearly two decades since it was first aired. One problem is that of institutional fit, because in the U.S. labor unions function as firm-based organizations, whereas in Continental Europe (where this idea has gained
some traction) they do not, thus permitting creation of a dual track for
employee representation (collective bargaining for distributive bargaining at the supra-enterprise level, and works councils for integrative bargaining at the level of the firm). Will these organizations operate in the
U.S. setting as mere beachheads for traditional union representation? If
so, the proposal has to be seen as one effectively mandating union representation for all workforces, and needs to be justified accordingly. Informational problems should not serve as the tail wagging a much larger
dog.
There are other questions that would need to be addressed. Some
go to efficacy: under what conditions are elected employee representatives likely to do a better job, than current arrangements, in gathering,
processing and disseminating relevant information? Can such an organ
function effectively without the institutional support of a labor union?
Others go to costs: what are the costs of such a proposal in the U.S.
rights-based legal culture? Is it likely that the activities of the employee
organization could be limited to the information clearinghouse function?
Will these organs ultimately impose the same costs on firms as unions,
but without the same ability to function as effective bargaining agents?

26.

PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 282-95 (1990).

27. See id. at 294-95.
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